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Abstract 
Departing from prior research analyzing the implications of social structure for actors’ outcomes by 
applying either the ego-network or the global-network perspective, this study examines the 
implications of network communities for the invention productivity of firms. Network communities 
represent dense and  non-overlapping structural groups of actors in the social system. The network-
community lens helps identify new ways to study firms’ access to diverse knowledge inputs in a 
dynamic system of interorganizational relationships. Specifically, we examine how the membership 
dynamics of a network community affect the invention productivity of member firms by either 
enabling or constraining access to broad, diverse knowledge inputs. Our findings suggest, first, that 
a firm reaps the greatest invention benefits in a network community with moderate levels of 
membership turnover. Second, a firm attains the greatest invention productivity when its own rate 
of movement across different network communities is moderate. Third, we find that community 
members located in the core of their network community can benefit more from membership 
dynamics and prior community affiliations than those on its periphery. In empirical analyses, we 
use the evolving community structure of the network of interorganizational partnerships in the 
global computer industry over 1981-2001 to predict firms’ patenting rates.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, scholars have made significant advances in understanding how the social 
structure of markets impacts companies’ learning and invention productivity by shaping the flows 
of resources and information among them (Beckman & Haunschild, 2002; Greve, 2009; Lavie & 
Drori, 2012). Since the critical knowledge required for developing new inventions is often complex 
and noncodifiable, interorganizational relationships can be particularly instrumental in facilitating 
the exchange and transmission of tacit knowledge through joint action, collaborative learning, and 
direct observation (Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996). As a result, research suggests that the 
locus of invention activities is often situated in the networks of interorganizational ties because 
novel ideas are frequently born at the intersection of knowledge flows among different 
organizations (Powell, Koput & Smith-Doerr, 1996). 
Prior research has generally applied two complementary perspectives to explore the effects 
of interorganizational networks on firms’ invention productivity. The ego-network perspective 
suggests that a firm’s invention outcomes are linked to the magnitude, diversity, and accessibility of 
knowledge inputs, which are in turn critically shaped by the firm’s ties to its partners and the 
 2
partners’ ties among themselves (e.g., Ahuja, 2000; Zaheer & Bell, 2005). In contrast, the global-
network perspective has emphasized the benefits of knowledge diffusion through the broader social 
space, which includes the overall structure of firms and their ties within the industry (e.g., 
Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1997; Schilling & Phelps, 2007; Uzzi & Spiro, 2005). According to this 
view, a firm’s ability to invent is often intricately linked to the extent to which the global network 
supports or inhibits the flows of knowledge and ideas through the industry. In one application of 
this approach,  Schilling and Phelps (2007) have found that the degree of small-worldness of a 
global, industry-wide network positively affects the invention rates of firms in that industry.  
In this paper, we suggest that both perspectives risk providing an incomplete picture of the 
relationship between networks and invention because they do not account for the role of network 
communities in affecting firms’ generation of new knowledge. Inventions refer to the “development 
of a new idea or an act of creation” in the product or service space (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001: 523). 
As such, inventions are a critical antecedent to innovation, which entails the commercialization of 
an invention and thus constitutes the cornerstone of firms’ entrepreneurial activities (Scherer & 
Ross, 1990). 
Network communities, in turn, represent dense, non-overlapping structural groups within the 
network, in which actors are connected more to each other than to actors outside the group (see 
Figure 1) (e.g., Knoke, 2009: 1697). Network communities are prevalent in a range of 
interorganizational systems (e.g., Baum, Shipilov, & Rowley, 2003; Davis, Yoo, & Baker, 2003; 
Knoke, 2009). The value of adopting a perspective that focuses on the role of network communities 
lies in identifying new ways to examine firms’ access to diverse knowledge inputs in a dynamic 
system of interorganizational relationships. This third perspective has thus far escaped the attention 
of both the ego-network and the global-network perspectives. Specifically, the focus on network 
communities differs from these perspectives in using the boundaries of network communities, rather 
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than the properties of an ego-network (e.g., Ahuja, 2000) or a global network (e.g., Schilling & 
Phelps, 2007), to demarcate heterogeneous knowledge inputs in interorganizational systems. 
Furthermore, examining network communities allows for a unique focus on the dynamics of firms' 
movement across different communities, which in turn provides new ways to capture how 
heterogeneous knowledge is redistributed through the interorganizational system over time.     
---------------------------- 
Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------- 
Network communities can impact firms’ invention productivity for two reasons. The first is 
related to our expectation that information, knowledge, and other critical resources are likely to be 
more homogeneous within rather than across network communities. Because the combination of 
dense connectivity within communities and sparse connectivity across communities can make it 
easier for firms to exchange knowledge with other members of their own community, such 
structures can homogenize knowledge within communities, while also engendering some degree of 
knowledge diversity across communities (Gulati, Sytch, & Tatarynowicz, 2012; Lazer & Friedman, 
2007). The second reason is that the short network distances and the reduced transaction costs 
characterizing dense network structures within communities can make it easier for firms to access 
and utilize the resources of their own network community, rather than the more distant resources of 
the broader interorganizational network (Coleman, 1988; Greif, 1989; Gulati, 1995). 
Nevertheless, the combination of the relative ease in accessing the knowledge inputs of a 
firm's own community and the community’s structural isolation from the rest of the network points 
to a possible tension concerning how network communities can affect firms’ invention output. On 
the one hand, a network community's cohesion can facilitate the invention productivity of member 
firms by allowing them to access the local pool of knowledge through either their direct ties or the 
short, indirect ties to other community members (Ahuja, 2000; Haunschild & Beckman, 1998). 
Having such a common knowledge platform may also offer the firm a wider and more easily 
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identifiable range of opportunities for recombining the complementary knowledge inputs available 
in its community. On the other hand, community affiliation can stifle invention productivity because 
of the structural isolation of network communities from one another and their relative isolation from 
the broader network. Knowledge, information, and other resources are likely to flow less freely 
across communities that have sparse connectivity and longer network distances between them. 
Thus, community members could  access only a fragment of the industry’s knowledge base, rather 
than the more heterogeneous knowledge available in the global network (Glasmeier, 1991).  
In this paper, we argue that one way to resolve this tension is by focusing on the dynamics 
of network communities. When analyzed through a dynamic lens, network communities can offer 
the benefit of easy access to knowledge that is both locally available and diverse. The  benefit of 
diverse knowledge becomes available as firms move across different network communities and thus 
change the composition of the network communities over time. Firms can benefit from the 
membership dynamics of network communities either indirectly or directly. The indirect effect 
results from the turnover of community members, which exposes the incumbents to the new 
knowledge and resources that are brought in by new community members. The direct effect, in turn, 
arises when a firm moves across different network communities over time, thus gaining direct 
exposure to the distinct knowledge bases of those communities. Because both of these effects can 
shape the diversity of knowledge that is locally available to the firm as a member of a given 
network community, we expect them both to influence the firm’s invention productivity. We further 
examine how these effects can vary depending on the firm’s structural position in its community 
and the overall diversity of knowledge across the communities.  
Exploring the dynamics of network communities can result in significant theoretical 
implications that extend beyond those offered by the ego-network and global-network perspectives. 
First, the network-community perspective advances the existing perspectives by capturing the 
distribution of and access to heterogeneous knowledge and resources in social systems. Most 
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notably, the ego-network perspective links access to diverse knowledge and resources to those ego-
network positions that span structural holes between otherwise unconnected actors (Burt, 1992, 
2004). We, in turn, extend this reasoning by suggesting that the boundaries of network communities 
can be used to effectively demarcate the heterogeneity of knowledge inputs. Understanding the 
structure and dynamics of network communities can thus advance the structural theories of action 
and outcomes beyond the implications generated by the ego-network perspective.  
Second, the dynamics of network communities and their impact on firms’ invention 
productivity are difficult to capture empirically just by analyzing the characteristics of firms’ ego 
networks or the properties of the global network over time. For instance, one can envision a 
situation where two firms maintain the same structures of ego networks but one could be a member 
of a highly dynamic network community with a high degree of membership turnover, while the 
other could be a member of a static community. Similarly, given two firms with the same ego 
networks, one could move across different network communities frequently, while the other could 
remain in the same community over time. Furthermore, while the global network can remain stable 
across a range of structural properties, these stable patterns may conceal the membership dynamics 
taking place inside network communities. The network-community perspective can thus locate 
sources of informative variance in these situations that might otherwise be overlooked. Against this 
backdrop, consider that the existing network models of behaviors and outcomes often leave a lot of 
unexplained variance. For example, we frequently observe situations in which actors residing in the 
same global network and with the same ego-network structure can obtain different outcomes (e.g., 
Burt, 2012). The present focus on network communities can begin to address this issue, and thus 
enhance the explanatory power of socio-structural models of action and outcomes.   
Taken together, these considerations may lead scholars to incorporate a new stage in the 
systematic analysis of how network structures affect behaviors and outcomes of individual and 
corporate actors. This stage would explore how the composition and the dynamics of network 
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communities can affect actor outcomes. The focus on network communities is likely to be equally 
relevant for scholars examining network change and dynamics (e.g., Powell, White, Koput, & 
Owen-Smith, 2005; Zaheer & Soda, 2009). Understanding how network communities evolve 
alongside actors’ ego networks and the global network can provide a more comprehensive view of 
the evolution of social systems.    
Our empirical analyses are based on the network of interorganizational partnerships in the 
global computer industry from 1985 to 2001. This setting is particularly conducive to exploring our 
research question since firms’ invention output in this high-velocity sector not only is essential for 
competitive success and survival, but also depends critically on firms’ ability to access cutting-edge 
knowledge inputs (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995; Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988). More 
importantly, such access has often been linked to interorganizational partnerships that can offer 
particularly rich and efficient channels for knowledge flows throughout the industry (Hagedoorn, 
1993; Lee, 2007; Yang, Lin, & Lin, 2010). Moreover, firms in the computer industry have been 
observed to agglomerate into distinct network communities (Dedrick & Kraemer, 2005; Rosenkopf 
& Schilling, 2007). In this context, it is therefore reasonable to expect that firms’ invention 
productivity will be affected by properties of the interorganizational network and, in particular, by 
network communities within it. 
THEORY   
Network Communities  
Network communities can be found in a wide range of interorganizational settings. For 
example, many interorganizational networks have been identified as small-world systems featuring 
multiple dense, non-overlapping groups of firms that are only sparsely interlinked to other groups 
(e.g., Baum et al., 2003; Davis et al., 2003). Our perspective on network communities derives from 
structural accounts that define communities as densely connected and cohesive social groups (or 
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clusters) of actors, in which the actors are closer to each other than to other actors in the network. In 
this tradition, scholars applied sociometric techniques, such as hierarchical clustering, to identify 
regions of high density in the network structure; they then used these results to evaluate social 
proximity among corporations, state authorities, or elites (Laumann, Galaskiewicz, & Marsden, 
1978; Laumann & Marsden, 1979; Nohria & Garcia-Pont, 1991). Conceptually, this perspective 
builds on the notion of communities as interactional fields where community boundaries have been 
shaped predominately by actors’ interactions and the resulting social proximity among them 
(Kasarda & Janowitz, 1974; Kaufman, 1959; Turk, 1970; Upham, Rosenkopf, & Ungar, 2010).  
While this research has laid an important foundation for subsequent advances in the study of 
social systems, it has fallen short of systematically evaluating network communities as robust 
drivers of action. There are, however, two notable exceptions. One is the recent study by Greve 
(2009) that empirically documents the fact that firms located in the same network community are 
more likely to imitate each other than firms from other communities in adopting innovations. The 
other exception are the two recent studies by Rowley et al. (2004; 2005) that examine how the 
heterogeneity of firms in a community can affect a firm’s decision to leave the community, and 
show that this heterogeneity can also affect the member firm’s market performance. These 
exceptions notwithstanding, we still lack a systematic inquiry into how firms’ affiliations with 
network communities can shape their invention outcomes.   
More broadly, the present focus on network communities has important parallels to the 
studies of strategic groups and cognitive communities in industrial economics and strategy. 
Research on strategic groups identifies groups of similar firms along various dimensions of their 
strategy, such as the extent of their advertising and product branding; whether they operate in 
regional, national, or  multinational markets; and the extent and nature of their diversification into 
different lines of business (Caves & Porter, 1977: 251). The work on cognitive communities  
provides an important extension to this perspective by emphasizing that the material aspects of 
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strategy interact in complex ways with the beliefs and perceptions of key organizational decision 
makers to shape the industry’s competitive landscape (Porac, Thomas, & Baden-Fuller, 1989; 
Porac, Thomas, Wilson, Paton, & Kanfer, 1995). Both of these theoretical lenses thus offer unique 
but complementary insights into how the groupings of rivals in the same industry can explain firm-
level performance, beyond industry-specific or firm-specific factors. As such, these lenses are in 
alignment with our focus on network communities, in that we also point to an important 
determinant of organizational outcomes that exists at an intermediate level of analysis, which in our 
case is located between the structure of a firm’s network and the network structure of the industry. 
Nonetheless, our focus on network communities as densely connected groups of 
collaborating firms is distinct from the focus of prior research on groups of rivals. The 
characteristics typically ascribed to competing firms – similarities in strategic attributes, 
overlapping claims to the same resource space, and cognitive perceptions of rivalry (Ingram & Yue, 
2008; Porac et al., 1995) – are unlikely to have a one-to-one correspondence with patterns of 
collaboration (see, e.g., Thomas & Pollock, 1999). In fact, since many rivals avoid collaborating 
with one another, strategic groups are unlikely to be structurally dense (e.g., Madhavan, Koka, & 
Prescott, 1998: 454-455). Furthermore, research on groups of rivals aims to capture how members 
of the same group respond in a similar way to market disturbances or have power advantages over 
other groups in the industry (Caves and Porter, 1977: 252). In contrast, network communities are 
expected first and foremost to shape the flows of knowledge and its heterogeneity in the broader 
industry space. As a result of these conceptual differences, studying groups of rivals invites an 
analytic approach distinct from that needed to study network communities. While network 
communities are typically identified on the basis of dense patterns of collaborative interactions 
among firms (Sytch, Tatarynowicz, & Gulati, 2012), groups of rivals are captured through 
clustering based on similarities in firms’ attribute data or through sociometric techniques based on a 
high density of intragroup rivalry relations (Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1990; Porac et al., 1995). 
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Finally, the parallels between our focus on network communities and studies of industrial 
districts and technological clusters (e.g., Baptista & Swann, 1999; Saxenian, 1994) are worth 
noting. It is certainly plausible that regional collocation or technological similarity might correlate 
with pockets of dense organizational interconnectivity, and we account for these possibilities in our 
empirical strategy. Our focus on network communities is nonetheless distinct and more 
comprehensive. By examining the exact patterns of how a market's social structure is partitioned 
into network communities, we are more likely to capture the complex interplay of economic, 
geographical, technological, and social factors that jointly account for the formation of network 
communities (e.g., Gomes-Casseres, 1996; Knoke, 2009; Powell & Sandholtz, 2012). More 
importantly, we can capture the patterns of interorganizational relationships that support the 
ongoing flows of knowledge, information, and resources that are most likely to affect the member 
firms’ invention outcomes (e.g., Breschi & Malerba, 2005: 13; Cowan, 2005: 31; Whittington, 
Owen-Smith, & Powell, 2009: 117). These flows and the resultant distribution of knowledge and 
resources in industry space, which underlie the effect of network communities of firms’ invention 
outcomes, are not related to or conditional on the geographical proximity of firms.  
Network Communities and Knowledge Heterogeneity 
In comparison to either the ego-network or the global-network perspective, this paper strives 
to reorient the discussion on the sources of heterogeneity in social systems toward network 
communities as demarcating the boundaries of heterogeneous knowledge inputs. For ego-network 
theorists, it is connecting with many alters (Powell et al., 1996; Shan, Walker, & Kogut, 1994), and 
with those who are not connected to each other (Burt, 1992), that puts the ego at risk of generating 
new ideas. In other words, knowledge heterogeneity is demarcated by the size of the ego’s ego 
network and the patterns of connectivity among the ego’s contacts. Some proponents of this 
perspective go so far as to suggest that network structures beyond the ego network may be 
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irrelevant for actors’ creativity (Burt, 2007). In contrast, for global network theorists, the key 
sources of heterogeneity lie in the properties of the global network (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 
1997; Centola & Macy, 2007; Uzzi & Spiro, 2005). For example, some of these scholars have 
linked the highest levels of creativity to moderate levels of small-worldness in the system, arguing 
that this structure provides actors with a broad and quick access to knowledge while also preserving 
its overall diversity (Uzzi & Spiro, 2005). In summary, extant theories suggest that knowledge 
heterogeneity in social systems – and the concomitant implications for actors’ invention output – 
can be captured by examining the properties of either an ego-network of ties around a single actor, 
or a global network of all actors and their ties in a given social system. 
In contrast to these theories, the community perspective offered here suggests that the 
boundaries of heterogeneous knowledge inputs in social systems are most precisely demarcated by 
the boundaries of cohesive network communities among actors. At the heart of this argument is the 
expectation that increased connectivity among actors within a network community and the resultant 
information flows between them can homogenize the knowledge stocks and flows inside the 
community (Gulati et al., 2012; Lazer & Friedman, 2007). As a result, actors may increasingly be 
tapping into the same or similar technological opportunities within their community and relying on 
increasingly redundant flows of knowledge and information.  
It is worth noting that the homogenization processes within network communities do not 
necessarily require knowledge and information to flow strictly through interorganizational ties. 
Relevant technological information could also travel outside of firms’ interactions, for example, 
through publications, trade exhibitions, conferences, or the Internet (Porac et al., 1989; Rosenkopf, 
Metiu, & George, 2001). Nevertheless, it is reasonable to expect that the presence of a direct tie 
between two firms can make the diffusion of technological knowledge more likely, particularly in 
its more tacit and complex forms. The presence of an interorganizational tie allows for direct 
exposure, observation, demonstration, and experience of new knowledge, which are often essential 
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for effective knowledge transfer between firms (Mowery et al., 1996; Rogers, 2003). Furthermore, 
interorganizational ties engender both formal governance (Mayer & Argyres, 2004) and informal 
interactions (McEvily & Marcus, 2005; McEvily, Perrone, & Zaheer, 2003), which jointly enable 
knowledge and information to travel more effectively across organizational boundaries. 
The homogeneity of knowledge within network communities can also be partly related to 
the patterns of homophilous selection in partnership formation, such that interorganizational ties are 
more likely to form between two similar firms (Powell et al., 2005). This possibility in turn suggests 
that members of a given network community could be more similar to each other than to other firms 
in the network. Many of these similarities, such as having similar organizational cultures or similar 
experience in interorganizational partnerships, could pull organizations towards each other while 
also helping them avoid competitive frictions (Lavie, Haunschild, & Khanna, 2012; Wang & Zajac, 
2007). These similarities could also make members of the same network community more prone to 
identifying and focusing on similar technological and market opportunities, and using similar ways 
to seize these opportunities. In support of this conjecture, there is evidence, for example, that 
decision makers in similar companies may over time develop similar mental models of their market 
and competitive environment (Porac et al., 1989; 1995).  
While knowledge available inside a given network community is likely to be rather 
homogeneous due to the higher intensity of knowledge flows and greater similarity among the 
community members, a substantial degree of knowledge heterogeneity can still be preserved across 
different communities. In contrast to the high density of connections among firms within the same 
community, the network space between communities is described by rather sparse connectivity, 
thus lowering the intensity of knowledge transfer, exchange, and absorption across community 
boundaries. Furthermore, firms that belong to different communities are likely to exhibit lower 
similarity than those that belong to the same community. Taken together, these features can both 
preserve and reinforce the heterogeneity of knowledge across different network communities.  
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Thus, it appears that whether a given network community facilitates or constrains the 
invention productivity of its members is related in part to the degree to which these firms are 
exposed to the broader knowledge inputs of the global network. Hence, one way to systematically 
examine the effects of network communities on firms’ invention productivity is to identify which 
specific features of the community can best enable firms to access diverse knowledge and resources 
within the global network. In this paper, we explore how the knowledge base of a given network 
community can get updated through the movement of firms across different communities over time. 
The indirect effect of such updating for a member firm can be captured when its network 
community acquires a new member with a different stock of knowledge and expertise, which can 
potentially enhance the knowledge base available to community members. A direct effect is evident 
when the firm moves across network communities over time, thus gaining exposure to 
heterogeneous knowledge and resources.   
We further examine to what extent these effects are moderated by the structural position that 
a firm holds in its network community, and by knowledge diversity across communities, as 
reflected by the evolving properties of the global network. Taken together, all these effects allow us 
to establish a more compelling link between the effects of membership dynamics in network 
communities and the resultant updates to the knowledge base of communities. Our overall argument 
also identifies some critical interactions between the characteristics of the ego and global networks 
on the one hand, and the properties of network communities on the other, thus leading to a more 
encompassing, multilevel analysis of social structures in understanding firms’ invention outcomes. 
Membership Dynamics in Network Communities  
Membership Turnover 
Several recent studies have shown that interorganizational systems are characterized by 
frequent entries and exits of firms, as well as by pronounced changes in the patterns of 
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interorganizational tie formation, all of which can affect the distribution of ties and regions of high 
density across the global network (e.g., Greve, Baum, Mitsuhashi, & Rowley, 2010; Rosenkopf & 
Padula, 2008; Rowley et al., 2005). These occurrences are likely to propel changes in the 
membership composition of network communities over time. Scholars have also noted that 
compositional variation in social groups can have meaningful implications for the members’ 
invention outcomes and growth, since such diversity stimulates experimentation, flexibility, and the 
introduction of new ideas (e.g., Florida, 2002; Porter, Whittington, & Powell, 2005; Simmel, 1950). 
Compositional stability, in contrast, is likely to have the opposite effect.  
A network community characterized by some membership turnover may thus be able to 
avoid the homogenizing tendencies characterizing network communities.  Such membership 
turnover can be realized through vacancy chains, wherein the exits of some companies create a set 
of community membership opportunities cascading through the network (White, 1970). The 
departure of old members and the arrival of new ones can reduce conformity pressures and expose 
community incumbents to outside ideas, diverse resource profiles, novel collaboration routines, and 
different strategic agendas, all of which can help update  the community’s knowledge base and 
enhance the invention activities of the community members. 
As the rate of membership turnover increases, however, a community may reach a point of 
diminishing returns, where the costs of high turnover start to exceed the benefits. High levels of 
turnover in a community may threaten the stability of its collaborative routines and established 
knowledge-sharing practices, since trust among corporate actors takes a significant amount of time 
to develop. In the early stages of a relationship, actors are reluctant to make themselves vulnerable 
to one another, even though this may be required for a trusting relationship to develop (Blau, 1964). 
Decreasing levels of trust within a community as a result of too much change may in turn increase 
the costs of forming and maintaining interorganizational ties, thus curbing firms’ access to the 
knowledge and resource pools located outside of their organizational boundaries and raising the 
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costs and risks of firms’ inventions (Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998). At least some member 
firms, however, could benefit from the development of a resource base unique to that community; 
this could include common training of personnel or the development of a shared technological 
platform. The development of such a resource base could nonetheless be interrupted or otherwise 
undermined if excessive membership turnover disrupts the continuity of intracommunity 
collaboration and its cohesion.  
In sum, it is reasonable to expect that a firm will derive the greatest benefits from being in a 
moderately dynamic network community. Moderate membership turnover reduces lock-in effects 
by opening up and updating the community’s knowledge base, without imposing the costs and risks 
associated with excessive turnover. Hence, we propose:  
Hypothesis 1: The turnover of community members within a firm’s network community has an 
inverted U-shape effect on the firm’s invention productivity, such that the firm will attain the 
highest invention productivity at a moderate rate of membership turnover.  
A Firm’s Movement Across Network Communities 
Rather than staying in the same network community over time, a firm can obtain diverse 
knowledge inputs by moving across different network communities. A firm may move across 
different communities as a result of the actions of other firms, which may propagate macro-level 
structural change in the network. In some cases, moving across network communities could be the 
result of a firm’s own pursuit of better resources or opportunities. While research on the 
implications of firms’ movement across network communities has been limited, studies of labor 
mobility have demonstrated that people who change jobs moderately often acquire the best 
positions in the labor market: they are more likely to locate job opportunities through short 
distances in the social network and to offer relevant job information to others. By contrast, staying 
in the same job for too long limits one’s exposure to new opportunities, while excessive job hopping 
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can limit one's ability to capitalize on the information and opportunities offered by each different 
group of colleagues (e.g., Granovetter, 1974: 85-92).  
There are reasons to believe that a similar curvilinear relationship could describe the link 
between a firm’s movement across network communities and its invention outcomes. Moderate 
mobility across communities could expose the firm to a diverse spectrum of inputs for invention, 
thereby helping it maintain a robust knowledge base for generating new ideas. In contrast, excessive 
movement across network communities can become a liability for at least three reasons. First, it can 
raise the costs of integrating the diverse knowledge stocks while also limiting the amount of 
organizational resources and attention that the firm can devote to any given recombinant activity 
(Ocasio, 1997). Second, excessive mobility could also raise the costs of social integration by 
conferring permanent newcomer status on any firm without a local collaborative history (Gulati, 
1995). Such a social position could then raise the transaction costs of accessing the community’s 
knowledge stocks, thus curbing the firm’s ability to utilize that knowledge. Finally, in at least some 
cases, a firm’s excessive mobility across network communities could result in a less coherent 
technological and collaborative profile (Zuckerman et al., 2003), making it harder for community 
members to discern the value of the knowledge offered by the newcomer. This could result in 
further hindering the transfer and application of knowledge by creating ambiguity around the new 
firm and limiting its ability to engage in full-fledged collaborations with community incumbents. 
In sum, we expect that moderate levels of mobility across network communities offer the 
best conditions for a firm to achieve high invention productivity. Such moderate movement can 
provide the firm with sufficiently diverse knowledge inputs for invention while also enabling it to 
absorb and utilize the new knowledge more effectively. Hence, we propose: 
Hypothesis 2:  A firm’s movement across different network communities has an inverted U-shape 
effect on the firm’s invention productivity, such that the firm will attain the highest invention 
productivity if it moves across network communities at a moderate rate. 
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Membership Dynamics and Firms’ Position in Network Communities 
Our predictions thus far imply that all members of a given network community can benefit 
equally from the moderate rate of community membership turnover and from the moderate 
movement across different network communities. However, even in the same network community, 
some firms may occupy more advantageous structural positions and thus have a more privileged 
access to the community's knowledge and resources (Dahlander & Frederiksen, 2012). If the 
benefits of moderate membership turnover and moderate movement across different communities 
are indeed linked to changes in the community knowledge base, then it is possible that a firm’s 
invention benefits will vary depending on its position in the network community. 
One central distinction that can critically shape a firm’s access to the knowledge and 
resources of its network community is the extent to which the firm occupies a core location in its 
community. This distinction helps understand whether the firm is strongly or weakly embedded in 
its network community. A core firm is strongly embedded by virtue of holding multiple ties to many 
firms, both central and less central, in the network community. In contrast, a peripheral firm is 
weakly embedded because it holds fewer ties to other community members and is significantly less 
likely to connect to more central community members (Borgatti & Everett, 1999). 
These differences in firms’ structural positions can be consequential for their ability to 
capitalize on the knowledge base of the network community. Actors positioned in the core of 
network structures tend to get superior access to the knowledge and resource base of their social 
system (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1997; Mintz & Schwartz, 1981). A core firm can exercise a 
wider reach across its network community, one which includes other core and peripheral members. 
This, in turn, can provide the firm with a broader and quicker access to the local knowledge base 
and resources in the network community. By having multiple ties in the network community, core 
firms can also ensure that they will have redundant channels for accessing the knowledge base of 
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the network community, thus opening wider conduits for knowledge flows and making themselves 
less vulnerable to the idiosyncrasies of any given partner or interorganizational relationship. 
As the knowledge base of the community gets updated through membership turnover, a core 
firm is likely to reap disproportionate benefits for its inventive activities by virtue of getting a more 
effective and efficient access to the influx of new knowledge. Similarly, as the firm moves across 
different network communities, occupying core positions in those communities is likely to provide 
the firm with a broader access to the diverse knowledge and resources in those communities. It can 
thus accumulate a better knowledge endowment over time. Thus, holding core positions as a firm 
moves across network communities is likely to create better opportunities for effectively 
recombining the knowledge from the firm's prior community affiliations.  
In sum, we expect that the extent to which a firm's invention outcomes can benefit from the 
membership dynamics of its network community and its movement across different network 
communities depend on the firm’s position in its network community. Specifically, we propose: 
Hypothesis 3a:  The inverted curvilinear relationship between community membership turnover and 
a firm’s invention productivity will be moderated by the firm’s core/periphery location in the 
community, such that a core firm will benefit more from a moderate rate of membership turnover 
than a peripheral firm.  
Hypothesis 3b:  The inverted curvilinear relationship between a firm’s movement across network 
communities and the firm’s invention productivity will be moderated by the firm’s core/periphery 
location in the communities it encounters, such that a firm occupying core positions will benefit 
more from a moderate rate of movement than a firm occupying peripheral positions. 
Membership Dynamics and Global Network Reach 
Our claim that the benefits of increased knowledge diversity are best conferred by moderate 
rates of community membership turnover and movement across different communities rests on the 
assumption that network communities can serve as pockets of diverse and nonredundant knowledge 
inputs. However, the heterogeneity of knowledge across different network communities depends on 
whether these communities can remain structurally separated from one another in the global 
network. Since members of different network communities are either entirely disconnected from 
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one another or are only indirectly connected through long network paths, the flows of knowledge 
and information are likely to be more intense within, rather than across, network communities. This 
implies that remaining structurally separated from one another can help communities preserve their 
relatively diverse knowledge and resource bases (Gulati et al., 2012; Lazer & Friedman, 2007). 
The degree of global network reach in the network helps describe the overall separation of 
actors in the network.1 Greater global network reach indicates that firms in the network can 
generally reach one another through shorter network paths. By the logic above, increases in the 
average global reach of firms in the global network can diminish the relative distinctiveness 
between the knowledge bases of different network communities. One reason for this is that direct 
connectivity can catalyze a more robust and continuous exchange of information and resources 
between firms. In a situation where firms are interconnected by shorter network paths, these paths 
can also serve as effective conduits for the flows of knowledge across different network 
communities. This, in turn, can familiarize firms with the resources of different communities and 
even allow them to internalize some of these resources directly. As a result, the knowledge base of a 
given network community can become more easily accessible to a wide range of non-member firms. 
Furthermore, new knowledge produced within a given network community may become more 
similar to the knowledge produced in other communities as all this knowledge builds on an 
increasingly homogeneous industry-wide knowledge. This argument draws in part on the recent 
work which has suggested that the patterns of knowledge flows in a network can shape the available 
knowledge stocks (Baum, Cowan, & Jonard, 2010; Gulati et al., 2012; Lazer & Friedman, 2007). 
In line with this argument, we expect that as firms become more reachable to one another in 
the global network, network communities may lose their distinct advantage of acting as pockets of 
                                                 
1 Analytically, global network reach is defined as the average shortest distance (geodesic) between any two actors in the network. To 
capture the distance between pairs of completely disconnected actors, this measure is based on inverted network distance or network 
reach (Borgatti, 2006), which sets the distance between completely disconnected actors to zero in the limit. Global network reach 
thus indicates how close  (rather than how far) any two actors are to each other (e.g., Schilling & Phelps, 2007). 
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diverse knowledge in the industry. Thus, even if firms manage to gain exposure beyond their own 
network community, they are likely to draw on an increasingly redundant pool of knowledge and 
resources from other communities. As a result, the invention benefits associated with a firm's 
membership in a moderately dynamic network community, or with moving across different network 
communities over time at a moderate rate, may decline. Hence, we propose:  
Hypothesis 4a:  The inverted curvilinear relationship between community membership turnover and 
a firm’s invention productivity will be moderated by global network reach, such that the positive 
effect of the moderate rate of membership turnover will be weaker at higher levels of global 
network reach. 
 
Hypothesis 4b:  The inverted curvilinear relationship between a firm’s movement across network 
communities and the firm’s invention productivity will be moderated by global network reach, such 
that the positive effect of the moderate rate of movement will be weaker at higher levels of global 
network reach. 
DATA AND METHODS 
In our empirical analyses, we used data on the network of interorganizational partnerships in 
the global computer industry from 1981 to 2001. To obtain these data, we used the MERIT-CATI 
database, which provides a comprehensive coverage of partnerships in high-technology sectors and 
has been extensively used in prior research (e.g., Gomes-Casseres, Hagedoorn, & Jaffe, 2006; 
Gulati, 1995; Hagedoorn, 1993). These partnerships can take a variety of forms, including joint 
ventures, contractual collaborative agreements, and licensing deals. Since most of these partnerships 
entail some form of knowledge flow related to the development of new products or technologies,  
they are often described as technology alliances (Rosenkopf & Schilling, 2007). In these 
partnerships, the personnel, the goal structures, the incentives, and the formal and informal 
organizational support mechanisms are geared toward the acquisition and transfer of technological 
expertise and knowledge. Focusing on the network constituted by these partnerships is therefore 
particularly useful for examining firms’ access to technological knowledge and its effects on firms’ 
invention productivity (e.g., Ahuja, 2000: 435; Rogers, 2003: 319-320; Zaheer & Soda, 2009: 13).    
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Because computer firms rarely formed partnerships prior to the 1980s (Hagedoorn, Cloodt, 
& Roijakkers, 2006), we used 1981-2001 as the timeline of the study to capture the evolutionary 
trajectory of the interorganizational network from its very inception. Given our focus on the 
computer industry, we considered only those ties in which one or both partners were classified as 
computer firms. To do so, we tracked the firms’ SIC codes and cross-checked them with the 
descriptive information obtained from business press and company websites. In addition, we used 
the description of the activities of each partnership to ensure that the database classified the 
partnership as a technology alliance whose objective was to develop new computer products, 
services, or technologies. These criteria produced a sample of 410 unique computer firms. About 60 
% of these firms were in manufacturing, 30% in services, and 10% in embedded systems (such as 
firmware or mobile applications). The average number of concurrent partnerships held by a single 
firm in any given year was 3.6, which includes both horizontal and vertical relationships.2  
To reconstruct the industry-wide partnership network, we followed the analytic procedures 
established in prior research. First, any two firms forming a partnership were considered to be 
connected through a dyadic tie. Thus, if the partnership consisted of more than two firms, we 
decomposed it into dyads (Stuart, 1998). Second, since alliance terminations were rarely reported 
and were indicated for only about 10% of the partnerships, we followed prior research and limited 
the duration of partnerships to five years (e.g., Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Kogut, 1988; Lavie & 
Rosenkopf, 2006; Stuart, 2000). Using 1985 as the first year for which we reconstructed the 
partnership network, we produced 17 yearly observations of the evolving network until 2001.  
                                                 
2 Given the broad enumeration of the interorganizational network in this study and the inclusion of both horizontal and vertical ties, it 
is important to note that the concept of network community differs from the concept of strategic block. Strategic blocks capture the 
connectivity among rival firms and have been found to homogenize the industry space in terms of firms’ capabilities and 
performance across blocks (Nohria & Garcia-Pont, 1991: 116-117, 122). In contrast, network communities are based on the patterns 
of collaboration among all companies in the industry, help understand the flows of knowledge in the industry, and associate 
community boundaries with heterogeneous knowledge endowments.  Network communities therefore play an influential role in 
shaping between-firm differences in invention outcomes.  
 21
The global network grew steadily from 27 firms in 1985 to the maximum size of 218 firms 
in 1996. It subsequently declined to 191 firms in 2001. Consistent with the characteristics of 
interorganizational networks observed across a range of industries (Rosenkopf & Schilling, 2007), 
the global network included a number of disconnected components. In our case, we found that the 
number of these components ranged from 10 in 1985 to 47 in 1996. One of these components was 
significantly larger than the others, comprising on average 60% of the firms. In contrast, the other 
components were smaller and mostly comprised just two or three firms. Figure 2 illustrates the 
global network in 1994. 
---------------------------- 
Figure 2 about here 
---------------------------- 
Dependent Variable 
We captured the invention productivity of firms using the counts of their successful patent 
applications. Patent applications provide an externally validated measure of invention (Griliches, 
1990), and are extensively used in the studies of firms' invention productivity in technology-
intensive sectors (e.g., Ahuja, 2000; Fleming, King, & Juda, 2007; Gomes-Casseres et al., 2006; 
Stuart, 2000).3 We defined the Number of patents in t+1 as the total number of patents applied for 
by the focal firm in year t+1. We accounted only for the patent applications that were eventually 
approved. Since patents can have different review lags, we considered the year of application as the 
point at which the invention was produced, even if the patent was granted at a later time. We 
extracted the patent data from the NBER database of U.S. patents (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 
2001). Even though about one-third of our network consisted of firms from outside the U.S., 
focusing on U.S. patents was motivated by two factors. First, empirical evidence suggests that many 
foreign firms apply for U.S. patents simply due to the sheer size of the U.S. market. As a result, 
                                                 
3 By focusing on a single industry and estimating firm-level fixed effects, we were able to eliminate a significant degree of 
unobserved heterogeneity related to firms’ varying propensiy to patent their inventions (Ahuja, 2000; Schilling & Phelps, 2007). 
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U.S. patents constitute a major share of all global patents, reflecting the breadth of invention 
activities of companies across the globe (Griliches, 1990). Second, using the patents from a single 
country ensures analytic consistency in terms of the legal norms and regulatory regimes (Ahuja, 
2000). 
Given the timeline of our study and our focus on the computer industry, we extracted patents 
filed between 1986 and 2002 that were classified under Category No. 2, Computers & 
Communications. This technological category encompasses the following four subcategories: No. 
21, Communications; No. 22, Computer Hardware & Software; No. 23, Computer Peripherals; and 
No. 24, Information Storage (Hall et al., 2001: 41). These criteria led us to identify 143,500 patents 
issued to the 410 firms in the sample, yielding an average of 350 patents per firm. The distribution 
of patents across firms was skewed, with the top 10% of firms holding over 80% of patents. 
Identification of Network Communities 
To test our hypotheses, we first analyzed the network in each year for the occurrence of 
cohesive, non-overlapping communities of firms.4 Having detected these communities, we then 
traced their evolution over time. To identify the communities in each year, we followed the 
approach of Girvan and Newman (2002), which offers one of the most robust methods of 
community identification (Danon, Diaz-Guilera, Duch, & Arenas, 2005). This approach identifies 
communities by assessing the difference in the community structure between the actual network and 
a random network of the same size and degree distribution. To quantify this difference, the method 
defines network modularity as 1/ ( { })kk kk
k
E e e− , where E is the total number of ties in the 
                                                 
4 While in this study we conceptualize network communities as non-overlapping groups of firms, some earlier theorists studied 
overlapping social groups (Blau & Schwartz, 1984; Simmel, 1955). These theorists typically view social structure through the lens of 
multiple social characteristics of actors that result from occupying different social roles or participating in different social contexts at 
the same time. For example, actors can simultaneously be colleagues and friends, and thus reside in different, but overlapping, social 
worlds of work and friendship.  In contrast, in our scenario we follow prior research (e.g., Burt, 2005; White, 1961) in isolating the 
communities of firms, which are formed because of the realized interactions among specific sets of corporate actors (McPherson, 
Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). In many sparsely connected social systems, these communities typically do not overlap (e.g., Girvan & 
Newman, 2002; Shipilov, Li, & Greve, 2011; Sytch et al., 2012). Note also that such non-overlapping communities need not result in 
a fragmented social structure since they are often tied together by sparse bridging relationships. 
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network, kke  is the number of ties in the k-th community, and { }kke  is the expected number of such 
ties in the random network. To ensure robust results, modularity is maximized over all possible 
community assignments and compared to a large number of random networks in order to assess its 
statistical significance (Guimerà & Amaral, 2005). Values greater than 0.3 typically indicate a 
strong degree of community structure that could not be obtained by chance (Newman, 2003).  
In addition to offering a statistically validated partitioning of the network, another advantage 
of this procedure – compared to some alternative methods of community detection (e.g., 
hierarchical clustering) – is that it does not require any a priori assumptions regarding, for instance, 
the number of communities. Providing such information ex ante is difficult in our context, where 
the network's community structure can be shaped by a range of social, technological, and economic 
forces. This, in turn, makes it difficult to predict the boundaries of network communities based on 
some observable attributes of firms, such as their technological or market niche. In addition, 
specifying communities ex ante could bias our subsequent statistical estimation and results. 
Our analysis of community structure focused on the global network’s main component, 
which comprised on average 110 firms. By contrast, the remaining components were substantially 
smaller and comprised on average only 2.2 firms, thus precluding the formal analysis of their 
community structure. However, we estimated that the average density of ties in the smaller 
components (defined as the ratio of existing to all possible ties) was 0.86 and the average path 
length was 1.24. These values mirrored those estimated for the network communities identified in 
the main component (around 0.81 and 1.28, respectively). We therefore considered the smaller 
components to be stand-alone communities. Nonetheless, to make sure that this approach did not 
affect our results, we also controlled for whether a firm was affiliated with the main component in 
any given year and whether it was in a community that consisted of a single dyadic partnership. 
 24
Our analyses revealed the existence of a strong community structure throughout the timeline 
of the study. The value of modularity varied between 0.36 in 1985 and 0.74 in 1990. The average 
value was 0.63 across all 17 years, thus substantially exceeding the recommended threshold of 0.3. 
Furthermore, our tests indicated that the identified community structure was statistically different 
from random across all years (at p < 0.001).5 The total number of communities in the global 
network ranged from 11 in 1985 to 55 in 1996. A typical network community consisted of between 
3 firms in 1985 and 8 firms in 1992. The mean density of ties within the communities was 0.81, 
while the mean density of ties in the entire network was less than 0.05. Furthermore, the shortest 
network distance between any two community members was 1.28 ties, while the shortest distance 
between any two firms in the main component was 4.14 ties. Overall, these results confirm our 
expectation that the identified communities reflected pockets of strong relational cohesion among 
firms. As an example, the structure of network communities in 1996 is shown in Figure 3. 
---------------------------- 
Figure 3 about here 
---------------------------- 
 
Knowledge Heterogeneity Within and Across Network Communities 
In addition to examining the structural characteristics of network communities, we explored 
whether the identified network communities also represented pockets of homogeneous knowledge 
within the industry. A thorough test of this argument would entail conducting a detailed analysis of 
the contents of knowledge stocks and flows among firms. In an interorganizational network of the 
size analyzed in this study, however, such analysis was impossible. Nevertheless, one useful proxy 
for testing whether the communities possessed more homogeneous knowledge compared to the rest 
of the network was to analyze the composition of patent stocks and patterns of patent citations 
                                                 
5 We compared the value of modularity for the actual network with the mean value estimated for a comparable random network in 
each year. The values for the random network were estimated over 1,000 randomizations using the size and degree distribution of the 
actual network. The tests indicated that the identified community structure was statistically different from random at p < 0.001. 
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within and across the identified network communities. To do so, we conducted two sets of analyses. 
First, we analyzed the patterns of patent citations and the distribution of patents across different 
technological classes within dyads. This analysis indicated that any two firms from the same 
network community were on average twice as likely to cite each other’s patents as the patents of 
firms located outside of the community (p < 0.001). Furthermore, the patents owned by firms from 
the same network community were more likely to be distributed across a similar set of three-digit 
technological classes (p < 0.001). Finally, the technological classes of the patents that either cited 
(i.e., forward citations), or were cited (i.e., backward citations) by, the patents owned by members 
of the same network community were more similar (p < 0.001) compared to the patent citations – 
whether forward or backward – for any two firms from different network communities. In 
additional statistically analyses, we have found that these patterns of homogeneity were related to 
both (i) homogenization of firms’ knowledge bases following membership in the same community; 
and (ii) selection of firms with more similar knowledge bases into the same community.  
Second, we used a computer simulation to explore the extent to which not only dyads but 
also entire network communities represent more homogeneous knowledge stocks. To do so, we 
randomly redistributed firms across the network communities in each year, while keeping the 
overall number of communities and the size of each community fixed. We repeated this procedure 
1,000 times for each year, and then used the results to compute the baseline similarity of the patent 
stocks and the forward and backward patent citations of firms within each community (using an 
inverse of Blau’s diversity metric). Subsequently, we compared the real and the baseline similarity 
scores statistically using a z-score, defined as ( { }) /S S σ− , where S  is the actual similarity of 
firms’ patents and patent citations with respect to the three-digit technological classes;{ }S is the 
baseline similarity estimated over 1,000 randomizations of the network’s community structure; and 
σ is the standard deviation from { }S . Results indicated that the differences were statistically 
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significant (at p < 0.001), thus suggesting that the knowledge stocks of network communities were 
indeed more homogeneous than one could expect by chance. 
Dynamics of Network Communities 
To trace the dynamics of the identified network communities over time, we matched them 
across contiguous years based on the extent to which they consisted of the same firms. Formally, we 
defined the overlap between two communities as , , 1 , , 1( ) / ( )i t j t i t j tC C C C+ +∩ ∪ , where , , 1i t j tC C +∩  
was the number of unique community members shared by both communities from year t to t+1, and 
, , 1i t j tC C +∪  was the number of all community members present in both communities. Zero indicated 
that the communities did not share any members, while 1 indicated that they shared all members.  
Using this rule, we considered ,i tC  and , 1j tC +  as a single dynamic community if the overlap 
between them was at least 30% and no other match provided a greater degree of overlap.6 Failing to 
satisfy the 30% requirement meant that the community in year t would be considered as dissolved 
and the community in t+1 would be considered as new. We identified 126 distinct communities 
within the 1985 to 2001 timeframe. The lifespan of network communities varied significantly from 
1 to 12 years, with the average being about 4 years. Similarly, firms varied significantly in terms of 
how long they stayed affiliated with a given community, which ranged from 1 to 9 years (2.5 years 
on average).    
Independent Variables  
To test the effect of membership turnover in a firm’s community on its invention 
productivity (Hypothesis 1), we defined Membership turnover as the extent to which the community 
comprised distinct firms in year t compared with the previous year. We measured this variable as 
                                                 
6 One possibility is also that an existing network community could break up into two (or more) future communities of roughly equal 
sizes. This possibility would require us to extend our analysis to more complex evolutionary patterns of communities, including their 
branching and reunification (see also Vedres & Stark, 2010). Our data did not provide any evidence of such nonlinear chains, most 
likely because our conceptualization of network communities as non-overlapping social groups does not support such processes. 
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the inverse of community overlap across both years – formally, , 1 , , 1 ,1 ( ) / ( )i t i t i t i tC C C C− −− ∩ ∪ . To 
test the effect of a firm’s movement across different network communities (Hypothesis 2), we 
defined Prior community affiliations as the number of distinct communities in which the firm was a 
member prior to t, excluding the current community. This variable was set to zero if the firm had no 
prior community affiliations (e.g., it just entered the network in year t). In line with Hypotheses 1 
and 2, we specified linear and squared effects for both of these predictors. 
To test the moderating impact of a firm’s position in its network community on membership 
turnover (Hypothesis 3a) and on the firm’s movement across different communities (Hypothesis 
3b), we interacted the curvilinear effects of Membership turnover and Prior community affiliations 
with the firm’s Within-community coreness. To define the actor-centric measure of coreness, we 
followed Borgatti & Everett (1999) and used the continuous core/periphery model. This model 
captures to what extent a firm is positioned closer to the core than the periphery of its network 
community and is more precise than the discrete model of core/periphery (for a similar approach, 
see Cattani & Ferriani, 2008). As indicated by Borgatti and Everett (1999: 392), it is reasonable to 
expect that a core firm will occupy a more central location within its network community. However, 
a central firm does not necessarily have to be core. In our context, the latter could occur when a 
peripheral firm connects with numerous other peripheral members of its network community, or 
with members of other network communities. In such a case, the peripheral firm may obtain a 
moderate to high level of centrality but still remain outside of the core of its network community. 
The measure of coreness is thus more likely than alternative measures to capture the benefits that 
accrue to a firm’s central position in its network community. 
To test Hypothesis 3a, we captured a firm’s coreness in its current network community. To 
test Hypothesis 3b, by contrast, we captured the time-varying average coreness of a firm, measured 
across all of its prior community affiliations up to the focal year. To obtain this measure, we 
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calculated the firm's within-community coreness in each year and divided the sum by the number of 
years the firm spent in the network, until t. This approach provided an effective way to account for 
the likely positive moderating effect of a firm’s moving into a more core location versus the likely 
negative effect of its moving into a more peripheral location (indicated by greater and lower average 
coreness, respectively). In addition, this approach also provided a more precise way to capture the 
full moderation effect of coreness with respect to a firm’s all prior community affiliations, rather 
than just the recent one. 
Finally, to test the moderating impact of global network reach on community membership 
turnover (Hypothesis 4a) and the firm’s movement across different network communities 
(Hypothesis 4b), we interacted the curvilinear effects of Membership turnover and Prior community 
affiliations with Global network reach. We specified Global network reach as the average network 
reach between any two firms in the network (Borgatti, 2006) - formally, 1/ ( 1) 1/t t ij
i j i
N N d
≠
−  , 
where tN  was the size of the network in year t and ijd  was the shortest network distance between 
two firms i and j. This measure varied between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating greater global 
network reach. To test Hypothesis 4b, rather than capturing current Global network reach in year t, 
we captured the time-varying effect of the firm's Average global network reach, which was 
measured across the firm’s entire history of community affiliations. We calculated global network 
reach for each year during which the firm was present in the network and then divided the sum by 
the total number of years the firm spent in the network, until t. This approach provided a more 
precise way to model the moderating effect of the change in global network reach and allowed us to 
capture moderation across the entire history a firm’s prior community affiliations. 
Control Variables 
To ensure robust results, we controlled for a range of other possible firm-level and 
community-level determinants of a firm’s invention productivity. First, using data from Compustat, 
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Worldscope, and Orbis, we controlled for firm size (measured through Headcount), financial 
condition (measured through Net income and Return on Assets), and investments in R&D (measured 
through R&D spending). These variables were logged to correct for their distributional skewness. 
 Second, to control for the effect of a firm’s ego-network position on its invention 
productivity, we specified two static measures: (i) logged Degree centrality as the total number of 
ties held by the firm in year t, and (ii) Ego-network density as the total number of ties between the 
firm and its partners and among the partners themselves, divided by the number of all possible ties 
among these firms. In addition, we also specified two dynamic measures: (i) Ego-network turnover 
as the degree of membership turnover in the firm’s ego network (defined as one minus the fraction 
of the same firms in the ego network from year t-1 to t), and (ii)  Ego-network growth as the change 
in the firm’s degree centrality from t-1 to t. In line with our non-linear prediction of the effect of 
community membership turnover, we expected Ego-network turnover to have an inverted U-impact 
on the firm's invention output. The latter variable also helped isolate the effect of ego-network 
turnover from the mere growth or shrinkage of the ego-network. Finally, we used the binary 
variable Main component firm to control  for a firm’s position inside the main component.  
Third, we accounted for the firm’s position in its network community by controlling for the 
main effect of Within-community coreness (as defined above). In addition, we controlled for the 
firm’s position with respect to other network communities by capturing the dispersion of its partners 
across different communities. To this end, we defined Cross-community participation as one minus 
the diversity of partners' own communities, measured using the Blau index. This control varied 
between 0 and 1, yielding higher values for those firms whose partners were distributed across a 
greater number of different network communities.7 Further, to control for the firm’s tenure in its 
                                                 
7 Our theory and analyses conceptualize and measure network communities as non-overlapping groups of firms. To explore the 
robustness of this theoretical premise, we conducted exploratory analyses of the data to explore more ambiguous cases, where a given 
firm could be assigned to more than one community in a given year by virtue of maintaining a large number of ties to communities 
other than its own. We found that, overall, these cases were extremely rare. First, there were only ten firm-year observations (i.e., just 
over 1% of the sample), where a firm’s total number of ties to other communities exceeded the number of ties to its own community. 
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current network community, we used the binary variable Community incumbent. This control was 
equal to 1 if the firm was a member of the same community in the previous year and 0 otherwise.  
Fourth, we controlled for a range of structural characteristics of the firm’s network 
community. We specified Community size as the total number of firms that were members of the 
firm’s network community in year t, including the focal firm. Community centrality, in turn, 
reflected the number of other unique communities to which the firm’s community was connected in 
year t. We defined Community constraint as the extent to which the neighboring communities were 
also connected among themselves (Burt, 1992). For any community i, this index was defined as 
2
,
( )ij ik kj
j i k i j
ε ε ε
≠ ≠
+  , where ijε  was the fraction of i’s ties with community j, ikε was the fraction of 
i’s ties with community k, and kjε  was the fraction of k’s ties with j. A higher value of this control 
indicated a more structurally constrained community. We also controlled for Community age as the 
number of years since the firm’s community had been formed, until t. Finally, to ensure that 
Membership turnover did not reflect a mere change in the size of the firm's community, we 
controlled for Community growth as the absolute change in Community size from year t-1 to t. 
Fifth, we accounted for the possible common effects of firms' knowledge stocks and 
geographical locations on their selection into network communities and their invention outcomes. 
To do so, we specified Technological diversity as the extent to which firms' patent stocks in the 
same network community were distributed across different three-digit classes (using the Blau 
index). This control yielded higher values for those communities whose patent stocks were more 
diverse. The alternative measure of technological diversity at the ego-network level correlated with 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Second, there was not a single case where a firm’s number of ties to a given external community (0.42 on average) exceed the 
number of ties the firm had within its own community (3.1 on average). These results indicate that if we were to relax the assumption 
of non-overlapping communities and allow for cross-community overlaps, such sparse external connectivity would put firms into 
unequivocally peripheral positions in other communities. Therefore, even without modeling community overlaps explicitly, our 
present analytic approach allows us to account well for firms’ positions with respect to multiple communities. We do so by 
accounting for (a) how firms connect within their focal community using Within-community coreness; and how they reach out to 
other communities in the network using Cross-community participation, which accounts for firms’ peripheral positions in other 
network communities. 
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this measure at over 0.8. In robustness tests, using this alternative control variable produced no 
changes in the results. Further, we specified Average geographical distance as the average spherical 
distance (expressed in miles) between the corporate headquarters of any two community members. 
In addition, we accounted for the dyadic communities in our data using a binary variable 
called Single dyadic partnership, set to 1 if the firm’s community consisted of just one dyadic 
partnership and 0 otherwise. Further, we used the binary variable Single large partnership, set to 1 
if the firm’s community contained only a single partnership consisting of more than two firms, and 
0 otherwise (such communities constituted about 5% of our data). We also specified Global network 
turnover as the degree of membership turnover at the level of the entire industry-wide network 
(defined as one minus the fraction of the same firms in the network from year t-1 to t). In line with 
our previous arguments, we modeled this control as a curvilinear effect. Coupled with the control 
for Ego network turnover, introducing this effect allowed us to more precisely account for the effect 
of membership turnover at the level of the firm's network community. To control for the possible 
exogenous shocks and the changes in network size, we specified the Number of community and 
network exits as the number of firms that left the firm's community in year t, while also leaving the 
entire network in the same year. After we incorporated all the variables and controls, the effective 
sample included 918 firm-year observations across 192 unique computer firms. 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
To test our predictions, we used two complementary statistical approaches. First, to control 
for unobservable heterogeneity among firms and overdispersion in patent applications, we used 
negative binomial regression with conditional firm-level fixed effects (Hausman, Hall, & Griliches, 
1984). Because our panel was relatively short and contained a large number of firms, estimation 
with conditional fixed effects is preferred to unconditional estimation. The latter approach could 
result in inconsistent estimates due to the incidental parameter problem, which arises when 
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relatively few observations are used to estimate a large number of parameters (Cameron & Trivedi, 
1998). Since the NB fixed-effects estimator is conditioned on the total sum of patents for each firm, 
firms that did not apply for a single patent over the entire 17-year period were eliminated from the 
estimation. This resulted in a truncation of the sample by about 20%, to 720 firm-year observations. 
Despite this limitation, the fixed-effects estimator should remain unbiased and consistent 
(Wooldridge, 2002). Nonetheless, we also verified the robustness of our results using alternative 
models that retained the full sample size (see robustness tests below).  
Second, to account for the nested structure of our observations within firms and within 
network communities, we utilized a three-level Poisson model. The analysis of variance in patent 
applications revealed that both firm-level groups (F=18.44, p<0.0001) and community-level groups 
(F=2.89, p< 0.0001) explained a statistically significant portion of the variance. A multilevel model 
allowed us to estimate both firm-specific and community-specific intercepts and coefficients as a 
function of the respective population means plus a random variance component. Doing so helped 
mitigate the risks of biased parameter estimates and incorrectly estimated standard errors due to the 
nested data structure (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). 
Specifically, we used a three-level Poisson model of firm-year outcomes (Level 1) with 
random intercepts estimated for firms (Level 2) and their network communities (Level 3). In 
addition, we also estimated firm-level and community-level random coefficients. The firm-level 
random coefficients were estimated for the firm's Prior community affiliations (H2) and its 
interactions with Average within-community coreness (H3b) and Average global network reach 
(H4b). The community-level random coefficients, in turn, were estimated for the effect of 
Membership turnover in the firm's community (H1) and its interactions with Within-community 
coreness (H3a) and Global network reach (H4a). We also estimated random coefficients for 
community-level controls of Community size, Community age, Community constraint, and the 
community's Technological diversity, because doing so significantly improved model fit (p<0.001).  
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Results 
The descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations are reported in Table 1. We verified that 
multicollinearity did not pose a serious threat in our estimation as the condition indices remained 
within the recommended range (Belsey, Kuh, & Welsch, 1980). In Tables 2 and 3, we report the 
results of our negative binomial models with firm-level fixed effects (Table 2, Models 1-7) and the 
three-level Poisson models with random intercepts and random coefficients (Table 3, Models 8-14). 
Models 6-7 and 13-14 represent the fully specified regressions containing all predicted effects.  
---------------------------------------------------- 
Tables 1, 2, & 3 and Figure 4 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 
In Models 1 and 8, we tested Hypotheses 1 and 2. The results support Hypothesis 1, 
indicating that membership turnover in a firm’s network community affects the firm’s invention 
productivity in an inversely curvilinear manner (see Figure 4a). Lind and Mehlum’s (2009) test 
supported the presence of an inverse u-shaped effect (t=1.78, p =0.038) with the inflection point at 
47% turnover. Over 52% of the observations in our sample fall above this inflection point. A typical 
member of a moderately dynamic community (i.e., one that retains about 55% of its members from 
year t-1 to t) tends to file for 19.5% more patents than a member of a static community (i.e., one 
that retains all of its members), and for 4.2% more patents than a member of a highly dynamic 
community (i.e., one that retains just 30% of its members). These results are also supported by our 
fully specified Models 6-7 and 13-14.  
Further, the results of Models 1 and 8 also support Hypothesis 2, indicating that the extent to 
which the firm moves across different network communities affects its invention productivity in an 
inversely curvilinear manner. The firm thus benefits the most if it moves across different network 
communities with a moderate frequency (see Figure 4b). Lind and Mehlum’s (2009) test supported 
the presence of an inverse u-shaped effect (t=2.16, p =0.016), indicating the inflection point at 5 
prior community affiliations. Even though this inflection point is well within the data range, only 
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about 2.5% of the observations in our sample fall above this level. Given this small number, in 
additional analyses we explored whether a logarithmic specification of the firm's prior community 
affiliations could potentially provide better fit to the data. Comparative analyses of model fit 
indicated, however, that the quadratic specification (AIC=4040.03) offers better fit than the 
logarithmic one (AIC=4041.60). A typical firm with a moderate rate of movement across different 
network communities (i.e., one with about 5 prior community affiliations) thus files for 
approximately twice as many patents as a firm with no prior community affiliations. It also files for 
about 50% more patents than a firm with 9 prior community affiliations. The results of our fully 
specified Models 6-7 and 13-14 support these estimates as well.  
In Models 2-3 and 9-10, we tested Hypotheses 3a and 3b. The results consistently support 
Hypothesis 3a, indicating that the positive effect of the moderate rate of community membership 
turnover is amplified for those firms that are located in the core of their network community. 
Specifically, the linear term of Membership turnover shows a significant positive interaction with 
the firm’s Within-community coreness (Models 2 and 9). Being located in the core of a moderately 
dynamic network community thus enables the firm to file for about 5% more patents than being 
located on the community's periphery (see Figure 4c). The results of our fully specified Models 6 
and 13 are consistent. Results, however, provide only partial support for Hypothesis 3b. While the 
prediction of a positive interaction between the firm's Prior community affiliations and its Average 
within-community coreness is not supported by our partial Models 3 and 10, it is supported by our 
fully specified Models 7 and 14. Based on the estimates of Model 7, Figure 4d demonstrates an 
interesting nuance to our original prediction: there is a noticeable shift in the inflection point in the 
effect of Prior community affiliations for core firms, from 5 to 3 communities. These results are 
likely to hint at the significant costs of entering into multiple network communities as a core 
member, which can exacerbate the cost of integration and create stronger ambiguity around the 
newcomer's collaborative profile (Zuckerman et al., 2003). These circumstances, in turn, can 
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overwhelm the benefits of accessing new invention inputs for core firms as they move across an 
increasing number of network communities. Peripheral members, in contrast, seem to be more 
immune to these risks. While over the range of 0 to 5 prior community affiliations, they register 
noticeably lower levels of invention productivity relative to core firms, at higher levels of 5 to 9 
community affiliations they enjoy superior invention benefits, which are coupled with a higher 
inflection point.  
Finally, our results do not support hypotheses H4a and H4b. These predictions suggested 
that lower global network reach would help maintain greater knowledge heterogeneity across 
different network communities, thus creating additional invention benefits to firms with moderate 
levels of membership turnover and a moderate number of prior community affiliations. In contrast 
to our expectations, negative binomial models (Models 6 and 7) demonstrate null effects for the 
respective interactions. The multi-level Poisson models (Models 12 and 13), in turn, provide 
estimates that are opposite to our expectations (see Figures 4e and 4f). While – given the lack of 
consistency across these distinct estimation approaches – the results of these models should be 
interpreted with caution, they could potentially point to a more complex relationship between global 
network reach, network community dynamics, and firms’ invention productivity. Specifically, this 
relationship could entail not only the heterogeneity of knowledge across communities, but also the 
degree to which knowledge can be absorbed and integrated by firms as a function of increasing 
global network reach.    
Overall, the results support our theory. We find that a firm's invention productivity benefits 
the most from moderate community dynamics, which can entail the necessary updates to the 
knowledge base in the firm's community. This can happen either indirectly, through community 
membership turnover, or directly through the firm’s movement across different network 
communities. Furthermore, we find that firms located in the core of their network community can 
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most effectively capitalize on the benefits of moderate membership turnover and moderate levels of 
prior community affiliations.  
Robustness Tests 
To ensure robust results, we conducted a range of additional tests. First, we explored a key 
alternative explanation for our findings. It could be that both the community's membership turnover 
and the firm’s movement across different network communities are driven by the firm’s new 
alliance formations (cf. Koka, Madhavan, & Prescott, 2006). Specifically, a greater prior propensity 
of the firm to form new alliances could boost both the member turnover in the firm's community 
and the firm's likelihood to move to another community. While, in our main analysis, we controlled 
for the firm’s degree centrality and changes in it, in additional analyses we also modeled the rate of 
membership turnover in its community from year t to t+1 and its likelihood to move to another 
community in t+1 as a function of new partnerships formed by the firm in year t. Results indicated a 
weak negative effect of prior ties on the subsequent rate of community membership turnover and no 
significant effect on the firm’s movement across different network communities, thus lending no 
support to the alternative explanation. From a conceptual standpoint, these results indicate that the 
observed community dynamics are substantially driven by the behaviors of other firms in the 
network, rather than the firm's own collaborative pursuits (cf. Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009). We also 
reran all our models while controlling separately for the firm’s new partnerships in year t. 
Second, we explored the sensitivity of our results to alternative ways of constructing the 
interorganizational network. While in the main analysis we modeled interorganizational ties as 
lasting for 5 years, in additional analyses we set the duration of ties to 3, 4, 6, and 7 years. In 
addition, we applied a set of alternative specifications (40%, 50%, and 60%) for the minimum 
fraction of firms that an evolving network community needs to preserve across two contiguous 
years. Our results remained substantively unchanged across these tests.  
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Third, we explored whether the study’s observation period from 1981 to 2001 captured the 
evolution of the interorganizational network in the computer industry from its very inception. To do 
so, we tracked the MERIT-CATI data all the way back to the 1960s. Our observations indicated that 
prior to the 1980s, the network was generally very small and sparse, containing only a handful of 
firms and ties. It was not until 1985 that this network developed a robust main component with 
some community structure in it. To verify this finding analytically, for all annual networks from the 
early 1980s and the 1990s we estimated the percolation threshold, or the probability of finding a 
large main component (Newman & Watts, 1999). We found that the average percolation threshold 
in 1985-2001 was three times greater than in 1980-1984, and about ten times greater than in 1960-
1979. To ensure that these findings were not unique to the MERTI-CATI database, we also verified 
them using data from the SDC Platinum database and obtained very similar results. Furthermore, to 
verify the sensitivity of our results to the possibility of missing partnership data, we performed a 
series of tests by removing up to 50% of the ties in each year at random. Even after such extreme 
manipulations, we found that the overall structure of network communities remained unchanged.8 
 Fourth, we explored the risk of right-censoring in our patent data.  Our data covered all 
patents filed from 1986 to 2002 and approved by the end of 2006. For the 143,500 patents in our 
sample, the mean duration of the review process at the USPTO was about 3.17 years. This average 
duration was consistent across firms, network communities, and the entire 17-year observation 
period. Given this finding and the four-year lead period with respect to the data used in this study, 
right-censoring is unlikely to pose a problem. Nevertheless, to verify this conclusion, we extended 
the lead period to five and six years, respectively, by truncating patent data first in 2001, and then in 
2000. We also explored whether accounting for differences in patent quality could affect our 
estimates. To do so, we weighted each patent by its forward citations. This measure correlated with 
                                                 
8 This result also echoes some prior findings on the general robustness of social and interorganizational networks to random data 
omissions (Kossinets, 2006; Schilling, 2009). 
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firms' raw patent count at 0.9. Finally, rather than capturing the patents filed in year t+1, we 
counted the patents filed within two and three years from t, respectively. Our statistical results 
remained robust to these modifications.  
Finally, we verified our statistical results using other estimation techniques. While the 
negative binomial regression model used in our main analysis can effectively deal with the issue of 
overdispersion in the dependent variable, it can also lead to biased estimates should the data suffer 
from autocorrelation or distributional misspecification. We therefore re-estimated our models using 
the firm-level fixed effects Poisson model (Cameron & Trivedi, 1998). In addition, to ensure that 
our results were not affected by sample truncation, we also ran a series of OLS models on the 
logged dependent variable. In contrast to the maximum-likelihood estimator which eliminates all 
firms with a constant zero outcome, the fixed-effects OLS estimator allows for retaining these firms 
in the estimation. The results of these additional tests were similar. 
DISCUSSION 
Departing from prior research that has applied either the ego-network or the global-network 
perspective to analyze the implications of social structure for the creation of knowledge, this study 
has examined the implications of network communities for the invention productivity of firms in the 
computer industry. Our focus on network communities has been motivated by two factors. First, 
since more heterogeneous inputs are likely to be located across rather than within network 
communities, the boundaries of network communities and the regions of high network density that 
they delineate can help evaluate the heterogeneity of critical knowledge inputs for firms’ invention 
activities. With respect to this argument, the community perspective offers a set of novel and unique 
theoretical insights that go beyond the findings of prior work that utilized either the ego-network or 
the global-network perspective. This is because these latter two perspectives draw on different 
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markers in understanding the distribution of knowledge in social systems, and neither of them can 
adequately account for the structure and dynamics of network communities among firms. 
Second, since network communities are characterized by shorter network distances and 
lower transaction costs of exchange, the locally available inputs are more easily accessible to firms 
than are inputs located elsewhere in the global network. But the fact that these inputs are locally 
accessible yet globally isolated, and thus are likely homogeneous, effectively generates a puzzle, in 
that communities can both enable and constrain firms’ invention productivity.  This paper has 
attempted to resolve this puzzle by focusing on how the dynamics of firms’ movement across 
network communities can help update the local knowledge base of a community, thus offering the 
joint benefits of easy access and diverse local knowledge to its members. 
Toward this end, our study produced three key findings. First, we found that the 
community’s membership turnover, defined as changes in its internal composition over time, has an 
inversely curvilinear effect on the invention productivity of the member firms. Specifically, a 
moderate rate of membership turnover enhances the member firms’ invention outcomes by updating 
the community’s knowledge base, thus conferring an advantage over members of more static 
communities. Extreme levels of membership turnover, however, constrain the member firms’ 
invention productivity, most likely by increasing the risks and costs of collaboration and thereby 
eroding the collaborative base of the community. Second, we found that a firm’s movement across 
different communities over time has an inversely curvilinear effect on its invention productivity. 
Hence, while some mobility can be necessary to ensure exposure to diverse knowledge inputs, 
excessive movement can increase the costs of integrating these new inputs and adjusting to new 
environments. Finally, our results indicate that not all members of a given network community 
benefit equally from the effects of membership turnover. Specifically, our results indicate that the 
community members who are located in the core of their network community can claim greater 
benefits from moderate levels membership turnover in their network community than those located 
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on its periphery. This result suggests that core firms may have quicker, broader, and generally more 
efficient access to the local knowledge base of their network community as it is updated by firms 
arriving from the outside of their network community. With respect to prior community affiliations, 
our results indicate that a lower degree of attachment for firms to network communities seems to 
allow for a greater degree of promiscuity that is effective for enabling their invention productivity. 
Put differently, our results point to an interesting tension between the costs and benefits of (a) deep 
integration and search just across a few network communities as a core member and (b) a quick 
scan and peripheral entry into numerous network communities.   
Our research and findings offer several contributions to organization theory. First, by 
emphasizing the role network communities play in demarcating the boundaries of homogeneous 
knowledge inputs, the results of this study advance our understanding of the relationship between 
networks and firms’ invention activities beyond the findings of both the ego-network perspective 
(Ahuja, 2000; Zaheer & Soda, 2009) and the global-network perspective (Schilling & Phelps, 2007; 
Uzzi & Spiro, 2005). More importantly, we demonstrate that the membership dynamics of network 
communities, and the knowledge updates they entail, can have fundamental implications for firms’ 
invention outcomes. This finding, therefore, casts doubt on the uniformity of the recent conclusion 
that only ego-networks matter for actor outcomes (Burt, 2007). It also suggests that future studies 
applying the ego-network perspective could pay closer attention to whether an ego’s alters are 
located in the same network communities or across different ones, since these structural distinctions 
critically shape the diversity of the alters’ knowledge and information.  
Our second contribution lies in explicating how the perspective on network communities 
helps uncover some novel ways in which global networks can evolve and in which actors’ 
individual network positions can change over time. This, in turn, offers a direct contribution to the 
studies of network dynamics (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Shipilov & Li, 2012; Zaheer & Soda, 2009). 
One key aspect of this contribution is related to recognizing membership dynamics in networks as 
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an influential dimension of network change. Our study suggests that the turnover of community 
members in the firm's network community and the firm's movement across different communities 
can provide critical access to heterogeneous knowledge and resources. Even more intriguingly, we 
find that the observed community dynamics are significantly driven by the behaviors of other firms 
in the network, rather than the firms' own pursuits. This finding, in turn, suggests a more balanced 
view (cf. Burt, 1992) on the sources of variation in network positions, where individual agency may 
be significantly constrained. It also points to the importance of considering changes in the broader 
network structure for understanding the antecedents in individual network positions.  
Third, our study shows that the properties of ego networks interact with the key features of 
network communities to shape actors’ behaviors and outcomes. In doing so, our research takes a 
step toward a more integrative, multi-level approach to the relationship between network structures 
and actors’ behaviors and outcomes (Brass, 2011). In our case, using such an integrative approach 
not only helps to establish a more comprehensive link between the properties of the global network 
and firms’ invention outcomes, but also provides for a more precise identification of the sources of 
knowledge heterogeneity in an interorganizational system.  
Finally, the perspective on network communities advanced in this study can also contribute 
to a number of related lines of research. For example, studies of industrial districts and regional 
economies (Buhr & Owen-Smith, 2011; Lazerson & Lorenzoni, 1999) could benefit from exploring 
how network communities form and evolve, interlinking firms both within and between districts.  
Such investigations could shed light on how social structures shape local productivity and invention 
output by raising or lowering the costs of economic exchange within and across geographical 
locales, as well as by either enabling or constraining knowledge flows. Similarly, there is promise in 
examining how an industry structure analysis that simultaneously decomposes the industry into 
network communities of collaborators and groups of rivals can inform a range of organizational 
outcomes (Thomas & Pollock, 1999). For example, one can envision various configurations and 
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dynamics in the industry, such that the space between network communities can be populated at a 
given point in time by various degrees of rivalry relationships. Such multi-dimensional space could 
allow for a deeper analysis of the flows of knowledge, information, and other resources in the 
industry. Adding a cognitive lens to the study of this multidimensional space (Porac et al., 1989; 
Porac et al., 1995) could advance our understanding beyond this study’s focus on firms’ inventions. 
To be specific, future research could fruitfully study a wide range of firms’ strategic actions and 
outcomes by examining the perceptions of collaboration and rivalry held by firm executives and by 
influential third parties (such as financial analysts). 
Another promising direction for future work would entail a more systematic analysis of how 
firm-level attributes interact with the membership dynamics of network communities highlighted in 
this study (see, e.g., Shipilov, 2006). In our additional analyses, we found that more profitable firms 
(as indicated by higher ROA) tend to reap the greatest invention benefits from moderate levels of 
membership dynamics. Other research suggests one possible mechanism underlying this effect: 
since profitable firms can have a more favorable bargaining position (Lavie, 2007), they may also 
be able to appropriate greater value from within-community relationships, perhaps at the expense of 
less successful community members. Taken together with our main findings, these results thus 
contrast with the findings of some earlier research pertaining to business groups, such as the 
Japanese keiretsu. They suggest that, rather than playing the redistributive role which is common in 
keiretsu (Lincoln, Gerlach, & Ahmadjian, 1996), network communities tend to increase inequality 
by allowing rich firms and firms in the core of their network community to get even richer. These 
findings thus indicate some early promise for additional research in this area.  
In closing, it is important to note that our theory and results are tailored to the analysis of 
sparsely connected interorganizational systems, where network communities typically do not 
overlap with one another. It is in part the lack of overlap and the sparse connectivity among the 
network communities that sustains the heterogeneity of knowledge and resources among them. 
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Extending the analysis to systems with overlapping network communities and those where actors 
could be members in more than one community at a time could generate fruitful novel insights. 
Furthermore, our theory and results involve an important and rather straightforward boundary 
condition. The application of the network-community lens to the study of interorganizational 
systems is contingent on the presence of a robust structure of network communities. While a strong 
community structure often characterizes a range of interorganizational and interpersonal settings 
(e.g., Baum, Rowley, & Shipilov, 2004; Davis et al., 2003; Shipilov & Li, 2012; Sytch et al., 2012), 
this is unlikely to be the case uniformly. To the extent that the global network resembles a random 
network in its properties, or displays a strong core-periphery structure, the application of the 
network-community lens would be limited.  
Nevertheless, whenever the network-community structure is found to be present, applying 
the network-community perspective could open up new avenues for analyzing a wider spectrum of 
different industrial and national contexts. For example, while some economies are organized around 
business groups, i.e., cohesive agglomerations of firms tied by economic relationships or 
governance control (see, for example, Carney et al., 2011; Lincoln et al., 1996), not all industrial 
and national domains feature such groups. Many business groups, such as the Japanese keiretsu or 
the Korean chaebol, are also unique in that they incorporate exchange partners and financing 
entities, have strong institutional support mechanisms, and display remarkable stability in affiliation 
patterns. Some theorists have thus concluded that these groups have no real counterparts in Western 
economies (e.g., Lincoln et al., 1996: 71). We believe, therefore, that a focus on network 
communities would allow for a more inclusive analysis and offer exciting opportunities for future 
research across a broader range of industrial, national, and institutional systems.
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations. 
 Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
DV Number of patents in t+1 86.31 197.65                             
1 Headcount (log)                                   3.24 2.35 -                            
2 Net income (log)                                 10.07 0.38 0.01 -                           
3 Return on Assets (log)                         2.86 0.01 0.14 0.06 -                          
4 R&D spending (log)                            5.36 1.92 0.64 0.00 0.19 -                         
5 Degree centrality (log)                        1.29 0.64 0.21 0.06 0.10 0.37 -                        
6 Ego-network density (log)                  0.78 0.28 -0.25 -0.05 -0.14 -0.49 -0.82 -                       
7 Main component firm                          0.73 0.44 0.23 0.00 0.11 0.29 0.28 -0.35 -                      
8 Ego-network turnover                         0.22 0.33 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 -                     
9 Ego-network growth (log)                   0.12 0.40 -0.03 0.01 0.05 -0.04 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.63 -                    
10 Within-community coreness               0.36 0.21 -0.10 0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.25 -0.19 -0.60 0.00 0.02 -                   
11 Avg. within-community coreness       0.37 0.19 -0.07 0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.21 -0.18 -0.60 0.01 -0.01 0.84 -                  
12 Cross-community participation           0.14 0.23 0.30 0.05 0.12 0.45 0.71 -0.74 0.38 -0.01 -0.02 0.05 0.04 -                 
13 Community incumbent                        0.60 0.49 -0.10 -0.03 -0.02 -0.12 0.02 0.07 -0.24 -0.56 -0.31 0.21 0.19 -0.13 -                
14 Community size                                  10.72 5.64 0.18 0.02 0.07 0.21 0.29 -0.26 0.75 -0.05 -0.02 -0.66 -0.60 0.28 -0.13 -               
15 Community centrality                         3.17 2.30 0.19 0.03 0.05 0.18 0.27 -0.24 0.69 -0.01 -0.03 -0.50 -0.47 0.32 -0.17 0.73 -              
16 Community constraint                         0.40 0.28 0.18 -0.02 0.11 0.25 0.21 -0.31 0.88 0.08 0.08 -0.48 -0.49 0.30 -0.20 0.52 0.41 -             
17 Community age                                   3.62 2.51 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.06 0.03 -0.08 0.13 -0.17 -0.13 -0.09 -0.02 0.03 0.28 0.20 0.08 0.12 -            
18 Community growth                             3.21 5.32 0.11 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.08 -0.12 0.31 0.18 0.15 -0.26 -0.21 0.10 -0.59 0.36 0.30 0.21 -0.39 -           
19 Technological diversity                       0.52 0.14 0.26 -0.02 0.04 0.25 0.21 -0.16 0.40 -0.01 0.01 -0.43 -0.41 0.13 -0.10 0.43 0.35 0.33 -0.12 0.24 -          
20 Avg. geographical distance                 7.69 0.99 0.18 0.00 0.09 0.22 0.14 -0.17 0.41 0.02 0.01 -0.32 -0.30 0.16 -0.09 0.36 0.33 0.34 0.09 0.12 0.45 -         
21 Single dyadic partnership                    0.11 0.32 -0.16 0.00 -0.07 -0.18 -0.33 0.28 -0.58 0.00 -0.07 0.58 0.51 -0.22 0.09 -0.55 -0.45 -0.51 -0.11 -0.18 -0.60 -0.40 -        
22 Single large partnership                      0.05 0.22 -0.12 0.00 -0.06 -0.17 0.03 0.19 -0.39 -0.03 0.08 0.16 0.18 -0.15 0.10 -0.28 -0.23 -0.34 -0.06 -0.11 -0.03 -0.14 -0.08 -       
23 Global-network turnover                     0.24 0.06 0.02 -0.01 0.07 -0.02 0.06 -0.06 0.02 0.14 0.14 -0.02 0.00 0.05 -0.06 0.00 0.06 -0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.06 0.03 -0.08 0.03 -      
24 Community and network exits            1.22 3.15 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.11 0.03 -0.02 0.15 -0.11 -0.11 -0.13 -0.12 0.02 0.10 0.22 0.14 0.04 0.22 -0.19 0.10 0.10 -0.10 -0.05 -0.10 -     
25 Global network reach                          0.10 0.02 -0.07 -0.06 -0.02 0.05 0.07 -0.13 0.13 0.06 0.08 -0.07 -0.02 0.06 -0.08 0.02 -0.07 0.13 0.00 0.08 0.03 0.06 -0.07 -0.09 0.22 -0.07 -    
26 Avg. global network reach                  0.10 0.01 0.03 -0.08 -0.02 0.12 0.24 -0.26 0.18 0.01 -0.08 -0.08 -0.05 0.22 -0.06 0.16 0.15 0.10 0.11 0.04 0.07 0.13 -0.19 -0.12 0.28 -0.10 0.70 -   
27 Membership turnover                          0.48 0.35 0.14 0.06 0.08 0.18 0.10 -0.20 0.40 0.42 0.21 -0.20 -0.22 0.21 -0.71 0.24 0.27 0.34 -0.29 0.65 0.13 0.17 -0.19 -0.20 0.12 -0.05 0.14 0.14 -  
28 Prior community affiliations               1.28 1.64 0.28 0.05 0.06 0.37 0.36 -0.42 0.37 -0.06 -0.24 -0.15 -0.20 0.44 -0.28 0.39 0.39 0.22 -0.05 0.26 0.19 0.19 -0.20 -0.18 -0.06 0.17 -0.08 0.25 0.32 - 
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Table 2.  Models 1-7: Negative binomial regression models with firm-level fixed effects. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Constant                                                   3.618     -0.639    4.026     3.399     -0.757     -0.657    0.779     
                                                           (10.605)   (10.791)   (10.564)   (10.610)   (10.625)   (10.794)   (10.548)   
Headcount (log)                                            0.097***   0.095***   0.097***   0.096***   0.093***   0.095***   0.094***   
                                                           (0.021)    (0.021)    (0.021)    (0.021)    (0.021)    (0.021)    (0.021)    
Net income (log)                                           -0.014     -0.006     -0.013     -0.010     -0.010     -0.005     -0.009     
                                                           (0.052)    (0.054)    (0.054)    (0.053)    (0.053)    (0.054)    (0.056)    
Return on Assets (log)                                                  -0.758     0.801      -0.970     -0.718     0.390      0.787      -0.245     
                                                           (3.715)    (3.783)    (3.704)    (3.718)    (3.712)    (3.785)    (3.686)    
R&D spending (log)                                         0.083***   0.078***   0.084***   0.084***   0.090***   0.079***   0.082***   
                                                           (0.028)    (0.028)    (0.029)    (0.028)    (0.028)    (0.028)    (0.028)    
Degree centrality (log)                                    0.155      0.076      0.114      0.154      0.071      0.077      0.011      
                                                           (0.122)    (0.124)    (0.109)    (0.121)    (0.119)    (0.124)    (0.108)    
Ego-network density (log)                                  0.258      0.131      0.302      0.255      0.025      0.134      0.118      
                                                           (0.235)    (0.238)    (0.241)    (0.235)    (0.235)    (0.239)    (0.240)    
Main component firm                                        -0.523**   -0.618***  -0.459**   -0.517**   -0.582***  -0.609***  -0.525**   
                                                           (0.216)    (0.218)    (0.218)    (0.215)    (0.210)    (0.218)    (0.211)    
Ego-network turnover                                       0.461***   0.439***   0.461***   0.466***   0.316**    0.443***   0.316**    
                                                           (0.160)    (0.160)    (0.159)    (0.160)    (0.157)    (0.160)    (0.157)    
Ego-network turnover2                         0.194      0.267      0.199      0.206      0.380      0.268      0.332      
                                                           (0.336)    (0.335)    (0.339)    (0.337)    (0.326)    (0.336)    (0.329)    
Ego-network growth (log)                                   -0.184**   -0.179**   -0.210***  -0.191**   -0.208***  -0.182**   -0.211***  
                                                           (0.076)    (0.076)    (0.078)    (0.077)    (0.074)    (0.076)    (0.076)    
Within-community coreness                                  -0.223     -0.197                -0.216     -0.206     -0.190                
                                                           (0.269)    (0.266)               (0.268)    (0.263)    (0.266)               
Avg. within-community coreness                                                   0.179                                       0.533      
                                                                                 (0.421)                                     (0.416)    
Cross-community participation                              0.542***   0.626***   0.586***   0.534***   0.510***   0.618***   0.595***   
                                                           (0.170)    (0.170)    (0.165)    (0.170)    (0.168)    (0.171)    (0.163)    
Community incumbent                                        0.297***   0.254***   0.288***   0.299***   0.287***   0.256***   0.272***   
                                                           (0.078)    (0.078)    (0.076)    (0.078)    (0.076)    (0.078)    (0.075)    
Community size                                             0.006      0.013      0.011      0.004      0.001      0.012      0.007      
                                                           (0.010)    (0.011)    (0.009)    (0.011)    (0.010)    (0.011)    (0.009)    
Community centrality                                       0.037**    0.032**    0.035**    0.040**    0.040***   0.034**    0.041***   
                                                           (0.016)    (0.016)    (0.016)    (0.016)    (0.015)    (0.016)    (0.015)    
Community constraint                                       -0.600**   -0.615***  -0.593**   -0.632***  -0.489**   -0.634***  -0.468**   
                                                           (0.234)    (0.234)    (0.233)    (0.234)    (0.228)    (0.235)    (0.228)    
Community age                                              0.012      0.013      0.008      0.012      0.021      0.013      0.017      
                                                           (0.014)    (0.015)    (0.014)    (0.014)    (0.014)    (0.015)    (0.014)    
Community growth                                           0.008      0.002      0.009      0.009      0.007      0.002      0.007      
                                                           (0.008)    (0.009)    (0.008)    (0.008)    (0.008)    (0.009)    (0.008)    
Technological diversity                                    0.393      0.516      0.349      0.377      0.650      0.501      0.555      
                                                           (0.410)    (0.408)    (0.410)    (0.412)    (0.409)    (0.409)    (0.408)    
Avg. geographical distance                                 -0.120**   -0.123**   -0.120**   -0.112**   -0.113**   -0.119**   -0.114**   
                                                           (0.053)    (0.053)    (0.053)    (0.054)    (0.052)    (0.054)    (0.052)    
Single dyadic partnership                                  -0.321*    -0.231     -0.420***  -0.339**   -0.311*    -0.247     -0.433***  
                                                           (0.169)    (0.170)    (0.161)    (0.170)    (0.166)    (0.172)    (0.158)    
Single large partnership                                   0.219      0.290      0.209      0.199      0.246      0.276      0.226      
                                                           (0.264)    (0.261)    (0.263)    (0.264)    (0.268)    (0.261)    (0.266)    
Global-network turnover                                    2.472***   2.500***   2.461***   2.464***   2.356***   2.489***   2.327***   
                                                           (0.544)    (0.538)    (0.540)    (0.549)    (0.538)    (0.544)    (0.535)    
Global-network turnover2                                   -28.306*** -27.903*** -27.912*** -28.137*** -23.476*** -27.794*** -22.749*** 
                                                           (7.176)    (7.103)    (7.108)    (7.266)    (7.003)    (7.183)    (6.947)    
Community and network exits                                -0.087***  -0.089***  -0.085***  -0.089***  -0.085***  -0.090***  -0.082***  
                                                           (0.011)    (0.011)    (0.011)    (0.011)    (0.011)    (0.011)    (0.011)    
Global network reach                                       -3.005*    -3.097*    -3.029*    -2.620                -2.870                
                                                           (1.651)    (1.648)    (1.627)    (1.761)               (1.754)               
Avg. global network reach                                                                              7.440**               7.572**    
                                                                                                       (3.125)               (3.167)    
Membership turnover                                        0.738**    0.659*     0.756**    0.747**    0.768**    0.666*     0.799**    
                                                           (0.359)    (0.369)    (0.356)    (0.366)    (0.353)    (0.374)    (0.350)    
Membership turnover2                                       -0.783**   -0.706**   -0.805**   -0.814**   -0.770**   -0.725**   -0.815**   
                                                           (0.350)    (0.349)    (0.348)    (0.354)    (0.344)    (0.354)    (0.343)    
Prior community affiliations                               0.280***   0.273***   0.302***   0.277***   0.247***   0.272***   0.265***   
                                                           (0.053)    (0.053)    (0.055)    (0.053)    (0.052)    (0.053)    (0.053)    
Prior community affiliations2                              -0.028***  -0.026***  -0.035***  -0.026***  -0.017**   -0.025***  -0.022**   
                                                           (0.008)    (0.008)    (0.008)    (0.008)    (0.008)    (0.008)    (0.009)    
Membership turnover x Within-community coreness                       3.142**                                     3.004*                
                                                                      (1.568)                                     (1.585)               
Membership turnover2 x Within-community coreness                      -3.528**                                    -3.382**              
                                                                      (1.365)                                     (1.382)               
Prior community affiliations x Avg. within-community coreness                        0.376                                       0.611**    
                                                                                 (0.301)                                     (0.298)    
Prior community affiliations2 x Avg. within-community coreness                       -0.116**                                    -0.126**   
                                                                                 (0.055)                                     (0.055)    
Membership turnover x Global network reach                                                  -15.030               -8.839                
                                                                                            (16.662)              (16.714)              
Membership turnover2 x Global network reach                                                 15.175                8.896                 
                                                                                            (13.749)              (13.820)              
Prior community affiliations x Avg. global network reach                                                   -2.650                -2.374     
                                                                                                       (4.854)               (4.909)    
Prior community affiliations2 x Avg. global network reach                                                  3.047***              3.090***   
                                             (1.070)               (1.085)    
Obs. 720 720 720 720 720 720 720
Log-likelihood -1989.01 -1983.10 -1986.46 -1988.19 -1977.91 -1982.82 -1975.19 
Log-likelihood ratio test relative to controls-only model (χ2) 32.46*** 44.28*** 38.59*** 34.11*** 68.25*** 44.84*** 73.89*** 
Standard errors in parentheses; two-tailed tests: ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 
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Table 3.  Models 8-14: Three-level Poisson regression models with random intercepts and random coefficients. 
 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Constant                                                   -17.208** -18.301** -15.224*  -18.385** -12.538    -18.883** -11.741   
                                                           (7.285)    (7.921)   (8.247)    (7.374)   (8.386)    (8.014)   (8.434)    
Headcount (log)                                            0.015      0.020     0.030**    0.013     0.048***   0.017     0.048***   
                                                           (0.012)    (0.013)   (0.014)    (0.013)   (0.014)    (0.013)   (0.014)    
Net income (log)                                           -0.034     -0.017    -0.039*    -0.043*   -0.044*    -0.029    -0.044*    
                                                           (0.022)    (0.023)   (0.023)    (0.023)   (0.023)    (0.023)   (0.023)    
Return on Assets (log)                                                  6.335**    6.620**   5.510*     6.851***  4.193      6.909**   3.930      
                                                           (2.550)    (2.753)   (2.873)    (2.580)   (2.926)    (2.776)   (2.941)    
R&D spending (log)                                         0.099***   0.081***  0.137***   0.096***  0.139***   0.079***  0.133***   
                                                           (0.016)    (0.017)   (0.019)    (0.018)   (0.020)    (0.018)   (0.020)    
Degree centrality (log)                                    0.545***   0.480***  0.629***   0.539***  0.470***   0.504***  0.377**    
                                                           (0.116)    (0.154)   (0.170)    (0.116)   (0.148)    (0.153)   (0.165)    
Ego-network density (log)                                  0.656***   0.637***  0.657***   0.651***  0.564**    0.628***  0.566**    
                                                           (0.178)    (0.214)   (0.230)    (0.180)   (0.239)    (0.214)   (0.241)    
Main component firm                                        -0.232     -0.188    -0.402     0.040     -0.422     0.059     -0.487     
                                                           (0.300)    (0.323)   (0.352)    (0.303)   (0.318)    (0.322)   (0.333)    
Ego-network turnover                                       -0.003     -0.170**  0.045      -0.034    0.117      -0.172**  0.115      
                                                           (0.068)    (0.076)   (0.084)    (0.070)   (0.080)    (0.077)   (0.081)    
Ego-network turnover2                         0.715***   0.880***  0.895***   0.731***  0.755***   0.835***  0.699***   
                                                           (0.138)    (0.164)   (0.185)    (0.139)   (0.166)    (0.165)   (0.166)    
Ego-network growth (log)                                   -0.280***  -0.167*** -0.292***  -0.266*** -0.326***  -0.145*** -0.274***  
                                                           (0.034)    (0.051)   (0.056)    (0.035)   (0.045)    (0.052)   (0.050)    
Within-community coreness                                  0.163      -0.172               0.155     0.289*     -0.225               
                                                           (0.141)    (0.351)              (0.145)   (0.151)    (0.335)              
Avg. within-community coreness                                                  -0.381                                    0.621      
                                                                                (0.791)                                   (0.610)    
Cross-community participation                              0.235**    0.243**   0.185      0.221**   0.376***   0.201*    0.384***   
                                                           (0.103)    (0.118)   (0.125)    (0.106)   (0.113)    (0.117)   (0.117)    
Community incumbent                                        0.055      0.036     0.016      0.044     0.073      0.027     0.064      
                                                           (0.037)    (0.039)   (0.043)    (0.038)   (0.045)    (0.039)   (0.046)    
Community size                                             -0.013     0.002     -0.003     -0.025    -0.004     -0.011    -0.002     
                                                           (0.019)    (0.019)   (0.019)    (0.019)   (0.019)    (0.020)   (0.019)    
Community centrality                                       0.003      0.004     0.002      -0.009    0.008      -0.005    0.008      
                                                           (0.009)    (0.009)   (0.010)    (0.012)   (0.010)    (0.011)   (0.010)    
Community constraint                                       -0.669***  -0.575**  -0.757***  -0.744*** -0.516*    -0.642*** -0.468*    
                                                           (0.233)    (0.258)   (0.280)    (0.190)   (0.274)    (0.235)   (0.274)    
Community age                                              -0.087**   -0.077**  -0.075**   -0.078**  -0.054     -0.073**  -0.052     
                                                           (0.034)    (0.033)   (0.037)    (0.033)   (0.038)    (0.034)   (0.038)    
Community growth                                           0.009      0.005     0.003      0.017***  0.005      0.012*    0.003      
                                                           (0.006)    (0.007)   (0.007)    (0.006)   (0.007)    (0.007)   (0.007)    
Technological diversity                                    0.275      0.619     0.429      0.011     0.626      0.381     0.493      
                                                           (0.446)    (0.474)   (0.494)    (0.584)   (0.502)    (0.518)   (0.508)    
Avg. geographical distance                                 0.069      0.069     0.090*     0.045     0.093*     0.078     0.078      
                                                           (0.048)    (0.051)   (0.053)    (0.062)   (0.056)    (0.061)   (0.056)    
Single dyadic partnership                                  -0.507***  -0.361**  -0.500***  -0.514*** -0.701***  -0.276    -0.710***  
                                                           (0.144)    (0.155)   (0.171)    (0.163)   (0.155)    (0.170)   (0.160)    
Single large partnership                                   -0.164     -0.146    -0.314     -0.146    -0.262     -0.170    -0.258     
                                                           (0.217)    (0.218)   (0.238)    (0.209)   (0.246)    (0.216)   (0.244)    
Global-network turnover                                    1.383***   1.521***  1.473***   1.296**   2.159***   1.509***  2.154***   
                                                           (0.388)    (0.405)   (0.409)    (0.526)   (0.441)    (0.466)   (0.445)    
Global-network turnover2                                   -11.562*** -10.117** -12.260*** -9.629**  -17.437*** -9.279**  -16.793*** 
                                                           (3.890)    (4.028)   (4.118)    (4.860)   (4.334)    (4.693)   (4.335)    
Community and network exits                                -0.061***  -0.066*** -0.064***  -0.060*** -0.072***  -0.064*** -0.073***  
                                                           (0.009)    (0.009)   (0.010)    (0.011)   (0.010)    (0.010)   (0.010)    
Global network reach                                       -4.845***  -4.601*** -4.883***  -4.776**             -5.848***            
                                                           (1.301)    (1.351)   (1.481)    (2.379)              (2.048)              
Avg. global network reach                                                                            4.567                5.572      
                                                                                                     (6.819)              (7.051)    
Membership turnover                                        0.983***   -0.081    0.812***   1.185***  0.821***   0.076     0.816***   
                                                           (0.216)    (0.445)   (0.238)    (0.253)   (0.239)    (0.471)   (0.240)    
Membership turnover2                                       -1.355***  -0.300    -1.235***  -1.502*** -1.161***  -0.482    -1.164***  
                                                           (0.237)    (0.426)   (0.257)    (0.275)   (0.260)    (0.447)   (0.260)    
Prior community affiliations                               1.058***   1.026***  1.142***   1.086***  0.793***   1.034***  0.934***   
                                                           (0.163)    (0.164)   (0.211)    (0.169)   (0.170)    (0.165)   (0.184)    
Prior community affiliations2                              -0.159*** -0.149*** -0.156***  -0.165*** -0.104***  -0.152*** -0.135***  
                                                           (0.033)   (0.033)   (0.046)    (0.034)   (0.030)    (0.033)   (0.035)    
Membership turnover x Within-community coreness                       2.196**                                   2.128**              
                                                                      (0.847)                                   (0.853)              
Membership turnover2 x Within-community coreness                      -2.214***                                 -2.065***            
                                                                      (0.743)                                   (0.763)              
Prior community affiliations x Avg. within-community coreness                       0.936                                     1.899**    
                                                                                (1.070)                                   (0.850)    
Prior community affiliations2 x Avg. within-community coreness                      -0.262                                    -0.410**   
                                                                                (0.288)                                   (0.195)    
Membership turnover x Global network reach                                                 13.021               28.143**             
                                                                                           (16.282)             (14.188)             
Membership turnover2 x Global network reach                                                -13.070              -28.086**            
                                                                                           (15.314)             (14.108)             
Prior community affiliations x Avg. global network reach                                                 18.803**             19.062**   
                                                                                                     (9.422)              (9.641)    
Prior community affiliations2 x Avg. global network reach                                                -2.464               -2.368     
                                           (2.628)              (2.796)    
Obs. 720 720 720 720 720 720 720
Log-likelihood -3106.17 -3084.93 -3045.00 -3098.44 -3021.09 -3079.35 -3019.27 
Log-likelihood ratio test relative to controls-only  model (χ2) 335.78*** 378.27*** 466.08*** 351.23*** 547.11*** 389.41*** 559.92*** 
Standard errors in parentheses; two-tailed tests: ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 
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Figures  
 
Fig. 1. The perspective on network communities versus the existing ego-network and global-network perspectives.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Structure of the global network in 1994.  Fig. 3. Community structure of the main component in 1994.  
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Fig. 4a-4f. Graphical presentation of the main statistical results. Predicted effects are estimated at the means of other covariates.  
(a) main effect of Membership turnover in a firm's network 
community (Model 1) 
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(b) main effect of a firm's Prior community affiliations 
(Model 1) 
3
4
5
6
7
8
N
o
.
 
o
f
 
f
i
l
e
d
 
p
a
t
e
n
t
s
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Prior community affiliations
 
(c) interaction between Membership turnover and a firm's 
Within-community coreness (Model 2) 
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(d) interaction between Prior community affiliations and a 
firm's Avg. within-community coreness (Model 7) 
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(e) interaction between Membership turnover and a firm's 
Global network reach (Model 13) 
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(f) interaction between the linear term of Prior community 
affiliations and a firm's Avg. global network reach (Model 12) 
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